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Abstract: 
This paper provides a first attempt in the literature to forecast the future evolution of 
income inequality with the demographic projections. The contribution of this paper is 
twofold. First, we establish a framework to quantify and analyze the effects of population 
ageing and the secular upward trend in educational attainment on income inequality. 
Second, we modify the human capital model and perform microsimulations to forecast a 
list of standard measures of income inequality of Hong Kong for the coming years of 2021, 
2026 and 2031 based on the projected changes in the demographic structure of Hong 
Kong’s working population. The pseudo out-of-sample forecasts are reasonably close to 
the corresponding realized values. Our true out-of-sample forecasts suggest that income 
disparity will be alleviated in the next 15 years, as a result of the increasingly equal spread 
of level of schooling across the workforce. 
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1. Introduction 
     The economy and the demographic structure of Hong Kong have both experienced 
dynamic and dramatic changes over the past few decades. Back in the 1950s after World 
War II, thanks to the skills, capital and labor brought by foreign firms and refugees from 
Mainland China, Hong Kong transformed from a territory specializing in entrepôt trade 
into a labor-intensive manufacturing hub.1 The fast-paced industrialization during the 
1960s and 1970s gained Hong Kong the reputation as one of the Four Asian Tigers2 in 
recognition of its exceptionally high economic growth and success in export-oriented light 
industries such as textile and clothing, toys and electronics. Benefiting from the tide of 
globalization and China’s Open Door Policy in the 1980s, Hong Kong’s economy 
underwent another major structural change. Factories relocated away from Hong Kong to 
take advantage of the lower labor and land costs at the north of the border (Wong, 1991). 
Meanwhile, there was a substantial expansion of the service sector. A huge number of high 
value-added jobs were created during the last three decades of the 20th century along with 
the boom of network technology and the increasing interaction between China and the 
Western world. In this “golden era” of unprecedented growth, a range of socioeconomic 
measures of living standard, including life expectancy, literacy rate and women’s rights in 
the workplace, improved significantly. 
 
     Despite having a small population, Hong Kong is one of the advanced open economies 
globally in terms of real GDP per capita. However, in order to assess the overall living standard 
of a region, it is also essential to consider how economic resources are distributed to 
different strata of the society. In recent years, voices have emerged in many developed 
countries, claiming that “the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer”, 
suggesting that there might be a trade-off between economic growth and distributive 
                                                            
1  The Cold War embargoes  imposed by the United States and the United Nations on China  in 1949 and 
1951 also facilitated the industrialization of Hong Kong during the 1950s. See Schenk (2008) for details. 
2  The Four Asian Tigers, also known as Four Asian Dragons or Four Little Dragons, refer to the economies 
of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. These small open East Asian economies all achieved an 
annual growth rate exceeding 7% in the 1970s. 
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equality. In response to rising public concerns about this phenomenon, a growing number 
of studies have investigated both the theoretical and the empirical relationship between 
inequality and growth.3 
 
     Although economists in general agree that inequality has been worsening in most 
developed countries since 1980 (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Piketty, 2014), there are many 
competing theories on its potential causes. Depending on the standard of measurement used, 
economic inequality can be driven by many underlying forces beyond the changes in the 
distribution of income among individuals. Thus, to design effective policies to pre-empt 
the possibility of a widening income gap in the future, we should start our analysis with 
three fundamental questions: (1) What aspects of inequality are we concerned with, (2) 
what are the corresponding determinants, and (3) how do these determinants evolve over 
time? While the first two questions have been well addressed in previous literature, there 
are only a limited number of studies attempting to forecast how the income distribution 
would look like in future years based on the projected trends of hypothesized determinants 
of inequality. After all, if foreseeable changes in the socioeconomic environment will 
reduce income inequality naturally in the future, then all we need to do is to simply wait 
for such events to occur. On the contrary, if we anticipate that ongoing demographic 
changes will inevitably widen the income gap in the future, then policymakers may have 
to think about how to ease the situation and come up with adequate measures at the current 
stage to prevent further deterioration in income disparity. 
 
Given the strategic role of inequality projections in policy-making, once we have 
chosen the relevant measurement of inequality, we can proceed to the next step and figure 
out the factors which can give rise to economic inequality in future periods. Previous 
research suggests that both population ageing and changes in educational composition can 
affect labor market outcomes, which in turn alter the income distribution among individuals 
and households (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Zhong, 2011; Yang and Qiu, 2016). In other 
words, as long as we can project the trends of certain demographic variables which are 
believed to be influential and robust in explaining income inequality in an ex post manner, 
we might be able to construct a model to give precise ex ante forecasts on the future 
                                                            
3  For a survey of some of the literature, see Kuznets (1955), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Aghion, Caroli 
and García‐Peñalosa (1999), Panizza (2002), Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Murphy and Topel (2016). 
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evolution of income distribution. It is therefore crucial to examine these relevant 
demographic traits in detail and investigate their relationships with income inequality. 
 
Hong Kong is a world-class metropolis renowned for its economic freedom and 
competitive labor force. However, it is also characterized by a high Gini coefficient and 
serious population ageing compared with other economies in the Asia-Pacific region.4 
These special features make Hong Kong an interesting case to study. In addition, given that 
the unique demographic structure of Hong Kong caused by waves of mass migrations in 
the second half of the 20th century, the retirement of post-war baby boomers is expected 
to exert a significant impact on the composition of Hong Kong’s workforce and its social 
security system.5 The ever-rising elderly dependency ratio and the increasing fraction of 
young workforce receiving tertiary education in Hong Kong, among other demographic 
trends, are also typical like the socioeconomic environments in developed economies, 
enabling us to study the respective implications of these demographic changes on the future 
evolution of income distribution. 
 
Using the 5%-sample raw data from Hong Kong Population Census and By-census, 
this paper estimates and analyzes the effects of population ageing and the proliferation of 
higher education institutes on income inequality among the working population in Hong 
Kong. On top of that, we modify the Mincerian earnings function and perform 
microsimulations to make forecasts of a list of standard measures of income inequality, 
including Gini coefficient, Theil index, Atkinson index, the variance of the log of income 
and the 90th percentile to 10th percentile income ratio for the years of 2021, 2026 and 2031 
based on the projected demographic changes in the workforce. Pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasts generated for the years 2006, 2011 and 2016 are reasonably close to their 
corresponding realized values. This suggests that the evolution of the demographic 
structure, specifically the changes in the distribution of age and educational attainment of 
the workforce, possess predictive power for the changes in the overall distribution of labor 
income. Meanwhile, the true out-of-sample forecasts imply that income inequality will be 
alleviated gradually in the next 15 years, mainly driven by a less dispersed distribution of 
schooling(education) among the workforce. 
                                                            
4  According to the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook (2017), Hong Kong ranked the 9th out of 
the 150 economies studied in terms of family income Gini index. 
5  See Wong (2017) for details. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
literature concerning income inequality. Some leading hypotheses about the causes of 
economic disparity, as well as other studies which focus on the income distribution in Hong 
Kong will be reviewed. Section 3 presents the baseline human capital model, which serves 
as a benchmark for analyzing the effects of ageing and the secular upward trend in 
education on earnings disparity, measured by the variance of the log of main employment 
income. Section 4 describes the Hong Kong Population Census and By-census datasets and 
the extrapolation procedure adopted. A list of commonly used income inequality indices 
from 1981 to 2016 are also reported to outline some stylized facts of Hong Kong’s income 
distribution. Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation and forecasting results obtained 
from the baseline model. Section 6 attempts to enrich the Mincerian earnings function to 
simulate the whole income distribution and generate income inequality forecasts for the 
years of 2021, 2026 and 2031. Section 7 concludes and offers directions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
    There is extensive literature documenting the trends of income inequality in different 
countries over different time horizons. A large body of research are also dedicated to testing 
and empirically verifying a great variety of hypotheses concerning the causes and 
consequences of economic inequality. In contrast, only a handful of studies have attempted 
to advance to the next level by commenting on how the distribution of income will evolve 
in future periods based on the established channels. We thereby briefly summarize the 
development of this field and review some of the relevant studies which focus on income 
disparity in Hong Kong to support the subsequent forecast. 
 
The oldest hypothesis of income inequality can probably be traced back to those that 
relate the distribution of income to the distribution of individuals’ “abilities” (Staehle, 1943; 
Mincer, 1958). Moore (1911) explicitly assumes that “industrial ability—general sagacity 
and energy—is distributed according to the normal or Gaussian law”. Consequently, the 
difference in wages among people was rationalized by the consensus that different people 
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have different abilities. While Schumpeter (1916) was once celebrated for this approach,6 
the logical weakness of the hypothesis soon led to its refutation. In particular, Pigou (1932) 
argued that empirically income usually follows the Pareto’s law of income distribution7 
instead of the Gaussian distribution. A paradox thus follows: How can the normal 
distribution of abilities be reconciled with the sharply skewed distribution of income? The 
generally accepted answer to this question provided by Pigou himself is that there are other 
omitted factors which intervene and distort the relation between ability and income. Since 
then, plenty of studies have been motivated to develop the model specifications and to 
provide alternative hypotheses for the rise of income inequality. 
 
     Among all the theories that have been proposed,8 skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) is one of the most widely recognized and citied explanations for the worsening 
income inequality over the past few decades. SBTC refers to a shift in production 
technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing the relative productivity 
of the former over the latter, which in turn raises the relative demand for skilled labor and 
induces a rise in the skill premium (Violante, 2008). Initiated by Schultz (1975) and 
popularized by Johnson (1997), a tide of research had been triggered to debate on the role, 
impacts and duration of technological changes. For example, Acemoglu (1998) 
documented the increase in supply of skilled labor from 1970 onwards and divided its 
impacts into short run and long run. In the short run, he proposed that the abundance of 
skilled labor leads to a decrease in skill premium through a substitution effect (a downward 
movement along the demand curve for skilled labor). However, in the long run, since the 
increase in skilled labor in the workforce facilitates the advancement of skill-
complementary technologies, the skill premium soars as a result of the disproportionate 
increase in productivity of the skilled labor over the unskilled (skilled labor demand curve 
shifts outwards), which in turn causes inequality in wages. In a follow-up paper, Acemoglu 
(2002) further expanded his theory by formalizing his insight that technological change 
                                                            
6  Schumpeter wrote in 1916, “The great idea of investigating the relationship between wage differences 
and differences in ability opens a vast perspective. The new trail is steep and stony, but it must be followed.” 
7  The Pareto distribution is also known and referred to as “80 – 20” rule, meaning that approximately 80% 
of the wealth or income of a society is held or earned by 20% of the population. 
8  Some examples  include discriminations  (Becker, 1971; Darity and Mason, 1998),  financial and capital 
market  imperfections  (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Clarke, Xu and Zou, 2006), 
international trade (Burtless, 1995; Furusawa and Konishi, 2016) and superstar effect (Rosen, 1981). 
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was skill-biased in the 20th century in contrast to skill-replacing in the 19th century. His 
argument is supported by the fact that both the real wages of high-skilled labor and the 
unemployment rate of unskilled labor have been rising simultaneously since the 1970s. 
 
     Apart from fostering SBTC, human capital variables can also affect income 
inequality via other channels. One recent example is given by Murphy and Topel (2016). 
By introducing the concept of “equilibrium inequality”, they argued that human capital 
investment responses to skill prices at both the extensive margin and the intensive margin. 
While the former means that the increase return of education will induce more people to 
attend college and thus produce more skilled labor, akin to how the output of an industry 
is expanded by the entry of new firms; the latter refers to the situation in which skilled 
workers acquire more human capital and apply them more intensively in the labor market 
sector when the prices of skills increase, similar to an expansion of output by intramarginal 
firms when rising market demand raises prices in a competitive market. Hence, if 
investment and utilization of human capital at the intensive margin are more responsive to 
the rise in skill prices than that at the extensive margin, the latter of which would lead to 
the creation of skilled workers which means that wage inequality will be exacerbated by 
the polarization of skills. 
 
In addition, skill-neutral structural reforms can also give rise to income inequality. 
For instance, some industries and positions require job candidates to obtain certain licenses 
or professional qualifications before they are eligible to apply. For management positions, 
it is often necessary to acquire a high level of human capital, usually by means of getting 
a college degree, or nowadays, a postgraduate one. With the existence of such signaling 
and screening devices, structural reforms would induce resource reallocation and naturally 
change the relative demand for labor across different industries or positions. However, 
labor supply might not be able to respond and adjust accordingly because retraining 
workers and human capital investment are costly processes (Blundell et al., 1999). In that 
case, income distribution could be altered. Furthermore, as the opportunity cost of human 
capital investment varies among individuals (Becker, 1967; Ben-Porath, 1967), it is also 
believed that the ease of gaining access to training and education, as well as the distribution 
of their returns, would affect the level of income inequality. 
 
8 
 
As one of the pioneers in applying the human capital approach to analyze this issue, 
Chiswick and Mincer (1972) used the United States Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
to explain and predict earnings inequality, measured by the variance of the log of 
individuals’ personal income by estimating a relative inequality function derived from the 
human capital earnings function. They found that their model achieves a high explanatory 
power in the analysis of annual income inequality during the postwar period between 1949 
and 1969, with the average error of prediction being less than 2% and individual errors 
never exceeding 5%. Their research concluded that income inequality was mainly caused 
by the dispersion of weeks of employment resulting from business cycle fluctuations, 
followed by changes in the distributions of schooling and age. 
 
     In Hong Kong, there are also some studies which seek to analyze the changing 
pattern of income distribution over the years. Chow and Papanek (1981) found that income 
disparity in Hong Kong did not deteriorate significantly during the period between 1957 
and 1976. By investigating the data from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, a research by 
Turner et al. (1991) reported a convergence of income between different classes of 
employees, which narrowed the income differentials in Hong Kong. Chau (1994) also 
proposed that the expansion of public education system substantially promoted the upward 
mobility of low-income households since the 1970s. All these findings suggest that there 
was no trade-off between growth and equality in Hong Kong before its handover in 1997. 
 
     On the other hand, some research works look into the effects of Hong Kong’s 
economic reform on income distribution. Hsia and Chow (1978) argued that in its early 
stage of economic development, rapid industrialization in Hong Kong contributed 
significantly to both the rise in its living standard and the decline in its household income 
inequality. In contrast, by examining the sectoral shifts of 25 broad industries in Hong 
Kong, Suen (1995) noted that the changes in industrial composition alone accounted for 
about 70% of the increase in income dispersion during the period between 1976 and 1991. 
Lam and Liu (1998) also used census data from 1981 and 1991 to show that shifts in the 
distribution of heterogeneous population groups caused by changes of the immigration 
policy could give rise to income inequality. 
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     In the latest thematic report published by the Census and Statistics Department 
(2017), it is proposed that both the acceleration of population ageing and the shrinking 
household size over time have contributed to an increase in household income inequality. 
Regarding the widening income gap in post-handover Hong Kong, Lui (2013) wrote an 
entire book to discuss several hypotheses. By categorizing the changes in income inequality 
by industry and by occupation, he founded that economic restructuring only accounted for 
around one-eighth of the change in income dispersion during the post-handover period, 
refuting the argument that economic transformation itself constitutes a major source of 
post-handover income inequality. Instead, he proposed an alternative hypothesis, claiming 
that the expansion of higher education was the true primary factor leading to rising 
inequality.9  
 
Recently, Wong (2017) studied issues related to income inequality in Hong Kong. 
He found that age, sex, education, marital status and immigration status were all relevant 
factors in explaining the changing pattern of individual income inequality between 1981 
and 2011, with education being the most influential determinant. However, in contrast to 
Lui (2013), Wong (2017) argued that failing to adopt an appropriate population policy, 
especially the indecision to provide sufficient post-secondary education opportunities 
under the context of increasing returns to education in the 1990s, fueled the increase in 
Hong Kong’s post-handover income dispersion. He also suggested that the lack of 
investment in human capital owing to financial market imperfections may have resulted in 
an adverse effect on intergenerational social mobility. 
 
     Existing literature concerning income inequality in Hong Kong has provided ample 
empirical evidence, with diversified ex post analyses to explain the historical trends of 
income dispersion. However, the lack of research conducted from an ex ante perspective, 
i.e. to make predictions or forecasts of future income inequality based on the projected 
trends of human capital variables, is puzzling.10  We therefore try to fill this gap by 
                                                            
9  Lui  (2013)  argues  that  higher  education  levels  like  college  degrees  and  high‐skilled  occupations  like 
managers and administrators usually contribute to a higher  intra‐group  income  inequality. With a  larger 
share of people belonging to these two groups, the overall income inequality will increase. 
10  One of the very few attempts to forecast income inequality is made by Gindelsky (2016). Using historical 
data from the CPS, she performed forecasts for eight measures of income inequality in the United States 
10 
 
following Chiswick and Mincer’s (1972) approach and performing microsimulations to 
forecast the future evolution of income inequality in Hong Kong. 
 
3. Baseline Human Capital Model 
     The human capital approach interprets schooling and post-school training as a form 
of investment which augments the productivity of workers. As specified in Chiswick and 
Mincer (1972), the relation between potential earnings11 and investment in human capital 
for the 𝑖th person in year 𝑗 can be expressed as 𝐸௜௝ ൌ 𝐸௜଴ ൅∑ 𝑟௜௧𝐶௜௧௝ିଵ௧ୀଵ                                                                      
where the potential earnings (𝐸௜௝ ) are decomposed into two parts: (i) the “original” 
endowment labor earnings (𝐸௜଴), and (ii) the sum of returns on previous human capital 
investment (𝐶௜௧ሻ. In equation (1), 𝑟௜௧  denotes individual 𝑖’s average rate of return to 
human capital investment in the 𝑡th year. 
 
Assuming that original endowment labor earnings are constant across years and 
individuals, we have 𝐸௜଴ ൌ 𝐸଴. Moreover, human capital investment is assumed to be a 
fraction of one’s potential earnings, i.e., 𝐶௜௧ ൌ 𝑘௜௧𝐸௜௧, where 𝑘௜௧ ∈ ሾ0, 1ሿ. Then, we can 
rewrite equation (1) as12 
                                                            
and predicted that while the top 1% share of income will rise slowly for households, the top 0.1% income 
share and inequality within the top 1% would fall over the period between 2015 and 2017. 
11  Potential earnings here refer to the main employment income that a person with a certain level of human 
capital can potentially earn, before subtracting any contemporaneous costs in training.   
12  For the  𝑖th person, when  𝑗 ൌ 1,  𝐸௜ଵ ൌ 𝐸଴ 
When  𝑗 ൌ 2,  𝐸௜ଶ ൌ 𝐸଴ ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵ𝐸௜ଵ ൌ 𝐸଴ሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵሻ 
When  𝑗 ൌ 3, 𝐸௜ଷ ൌ 𝐸଴ ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵ𝐸௜ଵ ൅ 𝑟௜ଶ𝑘௜ଶ𝐸௜ଶ ൌ 𝐸଴ሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵሻ ൅ 𝑟௜ଶ𝑘௜ଶ𝐸଴ሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵሻ ൌ 𝐸଴ሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜ଵ𝑘௜ଵሻሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜ଶ𝑘௜ଶሻ 
and so on. 
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𝐸௜௝ ൌ 𝐸଴ ൅෍𝑟௜௧𝑘௜௧𝐸௜௧௝ିଵ௧ୀଵ ൌ 𝐸଴ෑሺ1 ൅ 𝑟௜௧𝑘௜௧ሻ                                                  ௝ିଵ௧ୀଵ  
 
Since 𝑟௜௧𝑘௜௧ is small, by taking the natural logarithm on both sides of equation (2), 
we have the approximation 
ln൫𝐸௜௝൯ ൌ lnሺ𝐸଴ሻ ൅෍𝑟௜௧𝑘௜௧௝ିଵ௧ୀଵ                                                                 
 
     The  𝑗 െ 1 periods of human capital investment can be further divided into 𝑆 
years of schooling and 𝑗 െ 𝑆 െ 1 years of post-school training. For estimation purpose, it 
is also assumed that there are no part-time students, which means that the direct cost of 
formal schooling is the entirety of the student’s income he could earn with his human 
capital level. Thus, 𝑘௜௧ ൌ 1 and 𝐶௜௧ ൌ 𝐸௜௧ for schooling years. Moreover, the return to 
post-school training is assumed to be constant, i.e. 𝑟௜௧ ൌ 𝑟௜்  for all 𝑡 ൐ 𝑆. When these 
assumptions are incorporated into equation (3), we have 
ln൫𝐸௜௝൯ ൌ lnሺ𝐸଴ሻ ൅ 𝑟௜ௌ𝑆௜ ൅ 𝑟௜் ෍ 𝑘௜௧௝ିௌିଵ௧ୀௌାଵ                                                         
, where 𝑟௜ௌ denotes the average rate of return to schooling for individual 𝑖. 
 
     Although the interpretation of equation (4) is straightforward, potential earnings 𝐸௜௝ 
are not directly observable from the data. Hence, practical estimation requires the use of 
actual earnings (𝑌௜௝) as the dependent variable. By definition, 𝑌௜௝ is related to 𝐸௜௝ as 𝑌௜௝ ൌ ൫1 െ 𝑘௜௝൯𝐸௜௝                                                                          
, which is equivalent to 
ln൫𝑌௜௝൯ ൌ ln൫1 െ 𝑘௜௝൯ ൅ ln൫𝐸௜௝൯                                                               
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Nonetheless, 𝑘௜௧  could not be directly observable either. It is therefore necessary to 
specify an explicit functional form for 𝑘௜௧ to make the estimation feasible. Following the 
convention, 𝑘௜௧  is assumed to be a linear decreasing function of years of post-school 
training:13 𝑘௜௧ ൌ 𝑘଴ ቆ1 െ 𝑇௜𝑇௜∗ቇ      for 𝑡 ൐ 𝑆                                                           
, where 𝑘଴, 𝑇௜ and 𝑇௜∗ are the initial investment ratio, years of work experience and the 
last year of positive post-school training for individual 𝑖  respectively. Now, the term 𝑟௜் ∑ 𝑘௜௧௝ିௌିଵ௧ୀௌାଵ  in equation (4) is a parabolic function of the number of years of post-school 
training, and its maximum is reached when 𝑇௜ ൌ 𝑇௜∗ (i.e. 𝑘௜௧ ൌ 0). 
 
     Substituting equation (6) and (7) back to equation (4), we get14 
ln൫𝑌௜௝൯ ൌ ln൫1 െ 𝑘௜௝൯ ൅ lnሺ𝐸଴ሻ ൅ 𝑟௜ௌ𝑆௜ ൅ 𝑟௜் 𝑘0𝑇𝑖 െ 𝑟௜் 𝑘0
2𝑇௜∗ 𝑇𝑖2                                ሺ8ሻ 
, and the term ln൫1 െ 𝑘௜௝൯  can be further evaluated by a second-order Taylor series 
expansion around 𝑇௜∗: 
ln൫1 െ 𝑘௜௝൯ ൌ െ𝑘଴ ൬1 ൅ 𝑘଴
2
൰ ൅ 𝑘଴𝑇௜𝑇௜∗ ሺ1 ൅ 𝑘଴ሻ െ 𝑘଴ଶ𝑇௜ଶ2𝑇௜∗ଶ                        ሺ9ሻ 
Plugging equation (9) into equation (8) results in 
                                                            
13  There are some reasons to rationalize the assumption that  𝑘௜௧  decreases over one’s career. First, as 
post‐school  training  increases,  wages  received  by  the  worker  are  expected  to  increase  alongside  his 
productivity. Hence, the opportunity cost of time invested in post‐school training increases with additional 
experience, reducing the profitability of further investments. Second, the net present value of post‐school 
human capital investment will be higher the earlier it is undertaken, vice versa. 
14  Converting to continuous time, 
෍ 𝑘௜௧௝ିௌିଵ௧ୀ௦ାଵ ൌ෍𝑘௜௧்೔௧ୀ଴ ൎ න 𝑘௜௧்೔଴ 𝑑𝑇௜ ൌ 𝑘଴𝑇௜ െ 𝑘଴2𝑇∗ 𝑇௜ଶ 
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ln൫𝑌௜௝൯ ൌ ൤lnሺ𝐸଴ሻ െ 𝑘଴ ൬1 ൅ 𝑘଴
2
൰൨ ൅ 𝑟௜ௌ𝑆௜ ൅ ቈ𝑟௜் 𝑘଴ ൅ 𝑘଴𝑇௜∗ ሺ1 ൅ 𝑘଴ሻ቉ 𝑇௜ െ ቈ𝑟௜் 𝑘଴2𝑇௜∗ ൅ 𝑘଴ଶ2𝑇௜∗ଶ቉ 𝑇௜ଶ  
 ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ௜𝑆௜ ൅ 𝛽ଶ௜𝑇௜ ൅ 𝛽ଷ௜𝑇௜ଶ                                                              
 
Since data on workers’ post-school training are not available, we follow the 
convention and assume that labor market experience equals to age minus years of schooling 
minus 5 (𝑇 ൌ 𝐴 െ 𝑆 െ 5). This assumption enables the study of income distribution by age 
group rather than by experience group. Further simplifications are made with this standard 
earnings function before we derive the relative inequality function. First, following 
Chiswick and Mincer (1972), the squared term of experience is deleted because its 
inclusion would be computationally cumbersome, yet the additional explanatory power is 
not likely to be economically significant.15 Secondly, it is assumed that the returns to 
schooling and experience are both random variables that are uncorrelated with each other 
and vary across individuals. This implies that the variances of the coefficients of 𝑆 and 𝑇 
in equation (10) are both strictly greater than zero. Applying these modifications to 
equation (10), we obtain 
ln൫𝑌௜௝൯ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ௜𝑆௜ ൅ 𝛽ଶ௜ሺ𝐴௜ െ 𝑆௜ െ 5ሻ ൅  𝜀௜                                         ሺ11ሻ 
, where 𝜀௜  is a residual term which represents the combined effect of other omitted 
variables and measurement errors. 
 
Taking the variance operator on both sides of equation (11) results in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ ൌ ሾሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝜎ଶሺ𝑆ሻ ൅ ൣ𝛽ଶଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ൧𝜎ଶሺ𝐴ሻ 
                ൅ሾ2𝛽ଶሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝑅஺ௌ𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ𝜇ௌଶ  
                                       ൅𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሺ𝜇஺ െ 𝜇ௌ െ 5ሻଶ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝜀ሻ                                                      ሺ12ሻ 
                                                            
15  A caveat of imposing this assumption is that the slope coefficient of experience, i.e.  𝛽ଶ, would be biased 
downward. See Chiswick and Mincer (1972) for detailed elaboration. 
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, where 𝜎ଶሺ. ሻ  denotes the variance of the corresponding variable, 𝑅஺ௌ  denotes the 
correlation between age and schooling, and 𝜇஺ and 𝜇ௌ represent the mean level of age 
and schooling respectively. 
 
     In equation (12), the variance of log-earnings (𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ) is expressed in terms of 
both the level and the variance of age and schooling, as well as the correlation between 
them. Indeed, one advantage of measuring income inequality in terms of 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ is that 
it can be decomposed into different components and their respective effects can be 
analyzed separately. By taking the partial derivatives of the relative inequality function 
with respect to the independent variables, Table 1 lists the effect of a unit change in each 
demographic determinant on the dispersion of income. 
 
Table 1: Partial effects of the independent variables on income inequality 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ ൌ 2ሾሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ൅ ሾ2𝛽ଶሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝑅஺ௌ𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ 
 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ 2ൣ𝛽ଶଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ൧𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ ൅ ሾ2𝛽ଶሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝑅஺ௌ𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ  
 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜇ௌ ൌ 2ሾ𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝜇ௌ െ 2𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሺ𝜇஺ െ 5ሻ  
 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜇஺ ൌ 2ሺ𝜇஺ െ 𝜇ௌ െ 5ሻ𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ  
 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝑅஺ௌ ൌ ሾ2𝛽ଶሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ  
 
     The first determinant of income inequality is the variance in schooling among the 
workforce. Since schooling is a major determinant of one’s earnings, it is certain that 
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income inequality also depends critically on the distribution of education. The quantitative 
effect of a unit change in the dispersion of education on income inequality is represented 
by the partial derivative డఙమሾ୪୬ሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺௌሻ , as indicated by the first equation in Table 1. The 
magnitude of this effect depends on several factors. Firstly, when the returns to schooling 
( 𝛽ଵ ) rises, డఙమሾ୪୬ሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺௌሻ  will increase because education becomes more influential in 
determining one’s personal income, which in turn enlarges the effect of the distribution of 
schooling on the distribution of income. Secondly, the higher the 𝛽ଶ , the smaller the డఙమሾ୪୬ሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺௌሻ . This is because 𝛽ଶ  reflects the average effect of additional labor market 
experience, and this experience is proxied by 𝐴 െ 𝑆 െ 5. In other words, given that two 
workers of the same age, the worker who received one fewer year of schooling is assumed 
to have one additional year of work experience. Hence, when the workforce becomes more 
diverse in terms of educational attainment, the increase in 𝛽ଶ can mitigate its effect on 
income inequality by raising the income of those with less schooling (but with more work 
experience). Thirdly, an increase in 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ  will also reduce the effect of variance of 
schooling on income inequality. The rationale behind is that age and schooling are usually 
negatively correlated (i.e. 𝑅஺ௌ ൏ 0), which implies that young (less experienced) workers 
are in general more educated than old (more experienced) workers. In this case, the overall 
wage differential between young workers and old workers is lower. Thus, with a more 
extreme age distribution among the workforce, the dispersion of schooling would favor the 
less experienced young workers, so the impact of 𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ on 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ would be lower. 
Likewise, if 𝑅஺ௌ decreases, meaning that age and schooling among workers become more 
negatively correlated, then డఙమሾ୪୬ሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺௌሻ  will also decrease. 
 
     The second factor of income inequality is the variance of age. As a proxy for labor 
market experience, age reflects one’s productivity to some extent and plays a role in 
determining one’s income. Therefore, changes in the age composition of workforce can 
theoretically result in a change in income inequality. The second equation in Table 1 
specifies the impact of a unit increase in the dispersion of age on the dispersion of income. 
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Again, the magnitude of డఙమሾlnሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺ஺ሻ  depends on various factors in which their mechanisms 
and interpretations are similar to those mentioned for డఙమሾlnሺ௒ሻሿడఙሺௌሻ  above.  
 
     Apart from their variances, the levels of schooling and age also exert some effects 
on the distribution of income. Although it is traditionally believed that income inequality 
can be alleviated by promoting education, the model derived here suggests otherwise. The 
increase in average education level among workers would exacerbate income disparity 
since jobs requiring a high education level are usually more heterogeneous in nature, 
resulting in higher dispersion in income (Ruiz-Tagle, 2007; Lui, 2013). This effect is 
captured by the interaction term 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ𝜇ௌଶ in equation (12). For example, suppose there 
are two college graduates with one majoring in finance and the other majoring in history. 
Although both of them have received 16 years of formal schooling, the income disparity 
between them can be huge. The same argument can be applied to two college graduates 
majoring in the same subject but graduating from different universities with different 
rankings. In contrast, the degree of heterogeneity in jobs requiring only primary and 
secondary education is smaller, therefore a society with lower average education may have 
a lower disparity in income. 
 
     Age affects income inequality in a similar fashion. In general, as the average age of 
workers goes up, a relatively larger proportion of them will fall into the old-age group 
where income inequality is inherently larger. This is because when workers become more 
experienced as they age, some of them will be promoted to senior executive or management 
positions with considerable remuneration, while the others may not be able to enjoy a 
substantial increase in salary over the course of their career. On the contrary, for young 
workers with less work experience, the market for their skills is usually more competitive, 
leading to a smaller variance in their wages. Therefore, earnings inequality among 
experienced workers is generally higher, and this effect is reflected by the interaction term 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሺ𝜇஺ െ 𝜇ௌ െ 5ሻଶ  in equation (12). In other words, population ageing may be 
accompanied by a widening income distribution. 
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     Last but not least, the intercorrelation between age and schooling affects income 
inequality in a favorable way. In most developed countries, both the quality and the 
quantity of education have risen over time. This has given rise to a phenomenon called 
education inflation, with young workers nowadays receiving more formal schooling than 
their elder counterparts in general. As a result of the secular upward trend in education, the 
correlation between age and schooling is usually negative at any given point in time and is 
decreasing across generations, leading to a narrowing of earnings inequality. This 
inequality-easing channel is captured by the term ሾ2𝛽ଶሺ𝛽ଵ െ 𝛽ଶሻ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻሿ𝑅஺ௌ𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ 
in equation (12). 
 
In summary, the human capital approach views schooling and labor market 
experience as two fundamental drivers of labor productivity, which in turn determines 
one’s labor market earnings. As a result, changes in the demographic structure, particularly 
the distribution of age and education, together with the returns to them, as well as the 
interaction between them are the keys to understanding the evolution of income inequality 
among the workforce of a society. In order to forecast the dispersion of income, it is 
essential to project how these variables are going to change in future. 
 
4. Data and Extrapolation 
     This paper studies income inequality in Hong Kong at the individual level. Although 
the lack of an annual survey has hindered inequality forecasting and other related time 
series analyses, we make use of multiple sets of Population Census and By-census data to 
estimate the quantitative effects of demographic changes, specifically population ageing 
and education inflation among the workforce, on income disparity in Hong Kong over time. 
Based on the available cross-sectional data, we project and simulate the demographic 
structure for the years of 2021, 2026 and 2031 by extrapolation, from which we are able to 
predict future changes of the variance of log-income. We also generate pseudo out-of-
sample forecasts and true out-of-sample forecasts for other standard measures of income 
inequality.  
 
The Hong Kong Population Census has been conducted every ten years since 1961, 
covering all residents physically present in Hong Kong during the survey period; whereas 
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the Hong Kong Population By-census is conducted halfway between two consecutive 
censuses, covering one-tenth of all quarters in Hong Kong and all households and 
individuals therein. After publishing the official findings on the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population, the government would extract a random 
subsample from the full Census or By-census dataset to construct microdata files for 
scholars to conduct academic research. These unpublished census microdata files are 
compiled and processed by the Census and Statistics Department, thus the data source is 
regarded as highly reliable. Nevertheless, caution is required in comparing the results 
across census cohorts as statistical standards and the definition of some variables may have 
already changed over the years.16 Moreover, to protect respondent confidentiality, the 
income data are censored. The monthly main employment income is reported in the data 
as 99,998 for those who earned more than this amount in 1981, 1986 and 1991. This cap is 
relaxed to HK$150,000 from 1996 onwards. While this treatment would have essentially 
led to an underestimation of income inequality, the bias was expected to be trivial since the 
proportion of workers with such a high main employment income was very small.17 
 
This study applies the 5%-sample raw data from 1981 to 2016 to analyze income 
inequality among individuals aged between 25 and 64. Several conditions are set to 
enhance the accuracy of the estimation. Firstly, all income data are adjusted using the 
respective composite consumer price index (with 1981 as the base year) to facilitate 
comparison across years. Secondly, all foreign domestic helpers are excluded because their 
salaries are constrained by the law and usually not related to their education and experience. 
Thirdly, since the variance of the log of monthly main employment income is used as the 
measurement of income inequality in the following analysis and the logarithm of zero is 
undefined in mathematics, respondents who are not earning a positive main employment 
income are excluded. Finally, for the remaining observations, workers with main 
employment income below the 3rd percentile of the whole distribution are also excluded 
because their exceptionally low salaries are probably resulted from unreasonably short 
                                                            
16  For example, since 2001, the “resident population” approach has been adopted to conduct the censuses. 
In 1996, the Population By‐census was carried out under the de jure enumeration approach whereas the 
de facto enumeration approach was used in earlier censuses and by‐censuses. 
17  Only 0.2% of the sampled workers reported a monthly main employment income equal to or exceeding 
HK$ 99,998 in 1991. The share of such high income samples with a monthly main employment income not 
less than HK$ 150,000 increased to 0.9% in 2016.   
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working hours. Table 2 presents various measures of income inequality over the sample 
period. 
 
     Because different income inequality measures show a different degree of sensitivity 
to changes in different parts of the income distribution, they may show different trends 
over the years. However, from the increasing pattern shown by the Gini coefficient and the 
variance of log-income, we can still safely conclude that income inequality has been rising 
in general among the working population in Hong Kong, even though the increment over 
the post-handover period is not substantial. The Theil index is an inequality measure which 
is more responsive to changes at the top of the distribution. As both the Theil index and the 
P90/P50 ratio have exhibited rising trends in recent years, there is a possibility that the 
income share attributed to top income earners has increased. In contrast, the Atkinson index 
is more sensitive to the bottom part of the income distribution. Since the Statutory 
Minimum Wage came into force in 2011, both the Atkinson index and the P50/P10 ratio 
have recorded a decline in the latest census. 
 
Table 2: Income inequality among the working population in Hong Kong 
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 
Gini coefficient 0.394 0.408 0.409 0.423 0.425 0.430 0.432 0.439 
Theil index 0.362 0.366 0.347 0.361 0.344 0.351 0.348 0.362 
Atkinson index 0.230 0.243 0.241 0.254 0.256 0.261 0.262 0.256 
Variance of log-
income 
0.429 0.441 0.453 0.471 0.497 0.509 0.514 0.522 
P90/P50 2.353 2.362 2.500 3.000 2.917 2.885 2.878 2.941 
P50/P10 1.890 2.000 2.000 1.818 2.000 2.128 1.984 1.890 
 
     To make forecasts of future income inequality, it is necessary to project the future 
demographic structure and recognize how the composition of the workforce is going to 
change. Extrapolation is therefore needed to make the forecasting task feasible. The 2016 
Population By-census 5%-sample dataset is used to serve as a base for this extrapolation. 
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First, the population is divided into several categories according to gender, age and 
educational group. Since the workforce participation rate for never-married women is 
significantly higher than those who are ever-married (including those currently married, 
widowed and divorced/separated), females are further classified by their marital status. 
After such classification (e.g. males aged 25 – 29 with college degree, never-married 
females aged 40 – 44 with upper secondary education), We calculate the workforce 
participation rate for each group and the marriage rate for each female age-education 
group.18 The workforce participation rate is assumed to be constant over time, while the 
female marriage rate is projected based on an extrapolation of past trends. For individuals 
aged 30 or above, educational attainments are also assumed to be constant. The projected 
working population in each group is then extrapolated based on the change in the education 
proportions between 2011 and 2016. For instance, females aged 10 – 14 in 2016 will 
become 25 – 29 years old in 2031. At that time, some of them will have finished a college 
degree and gotten married. The percentage of college graduates among all females aged 25 
– 29 in 2031 is extrapolated by the corresponding proportion in 2016, plus three times the 
change in this proportion between 2011 and 2016.19 Multiplying this proportion by the 
projected population (i.e. the number of females aged 10 – 14 in 2016) and the 
corresponding marriage rate and workforce participation rate would result in the projected 
working population who are ever-married females aged 25 – 29 with a college degree in 
2031. Finally, the whole composition of the workforce in 2031 can simply be obtained by 
applying the same projection strategy to all groups and summing them up. 
 
     In addition to simulating the composition of the working population for 2021, 2026 
and 2031, the same extrapolation method can also be adopted using the 2001 Population 
Census 5%-sample dataset as the base for generating pseudo out-of-sample forecasts to 
check the usefulness of the model. The detailed projection figures of the workforce 
composition can be found in the Appendix. 
 
                                                            
18  The workforce participation rate is defined as the ratio of working population to the total population for 
the corresponding age‐education group. Similarly, the marriage rate here  is defined as the ratio of ever‐
married females to total females for the corresponding age‐education group. 
19  The change  in  the proportion between 2011 and 2016  is multiplied by 3 because 15 years will have 
passed in 2031. The extrapolated proportions are bounded by zero. 
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5. Estimation Results 
     The Mincerian earnings function and the income inequality function specified in 
Section 3 are used to estimate the effects of population ageing and the expansion of 
education system on income inequality quantitatively.20 Using the sample of working 
population aged 25 – 64 from the 2016 Hong Kong Population By-census 5%-sample 
dataset, the estimated result for equation (11) is reported below: 
ln 𝑦௜ ൌ 7.931 ൅ 0.129𝑆௜ ൅ 0.014𝑇௜ ൅ 𝜀௜ 
          ሺ0.0093ሻ ሺ0.0005ሻ   ሺ0.0001ሻ 𝑁 ൌ 145,400          𝑅ଶ ൌ 0.334 
Since 𝛽ଵ௜ and 𝛽ଶ௜ in equation (11) are random variables, which should vary across 
individuals, the sample is further divided into groups by gender and industry for the 
estimation of the variance of the two coefficients.21 Assuming the returns to schooling and 
work experience differ for people of different gender and for those who work in different 
industries, it is estimated that 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ෣ ൌ 0.00099 and 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ෣ ൌ 0.00003. With these 
statistics, equation (12) can be expressed as 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ ൌ ቂ൫𝛽ଵ෢െ 𝛽ଶ෢൯ଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ෣ ൅𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ෣ ቃ𝜎ଶሺ𝑆ሻ෣ ൅ ቂ𝛽ଶ෢ଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ෣ ቃ𝜎ଶሺ𝐴ሻ෣  
         ൅ൣ2𝛽ଶ෢൫𝛽ଵ෢െ 𝛽ଶ෢൯ െ 𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ൧𝑅஺ௌ෢ 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ෣𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ෣ ൅𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଵሻ෣ 𝑆̅ଶ 
         ൅𝜎ଶሺ𝛽ଶሻ෣ ሺ?̅? െ 𝑆̅ െ 5ሻଶ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝜀ሻ෣                                            
                    ൌ 0.0142𝜎ଶሺ𝑆ሻ෣ ൅ 0.0002𝜎ଶሺ𝐴ሻ෣ ൅ 0.0032𝑅஺ௌ෢ 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ෣𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ෣ ൅ 0.001𝑆̅ଶ൅ 0.00003ሺ?̅? െ 𝑆̅ െ 5ሻଶ ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝜀ሻ෣  
                                                            
20  This typical Mincerian earnings  function may suffer  from a selection bias, which may  lead to an over 
estimation of the coefficient of years of schooling. Some remedies for the bias have been discussed and 
proposed by Card (1999, 2001), Carneiro et al. (2011), Hanushek and Zhang (2009), Heckman et al. (2008), 
among others. For the purpose of this research, we follow the treatment presented in Chiswick and Mincer 
(1972) and assume the coefficient of education to be a random variable across individuals.   
21  The estimation results of equation (11) by gender and industry group are reported in the Appendix. 
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ൌ 0.202 ൅ 0.027 െ 0.056 ൅ 0.145 ൅ 0.019 ൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝜀ሻ෣          ൌ 0.337൅ 𝜎ଶሺ𝜀ሻ෣                                                                            
     The observed variance of the log of main employment income in 2016 is 0.522, as 
reported in Table 2. This human capital model suggests that 65% of income inequality 
among the workforce is attributed to its distribution of schooling and age. Moreover, both 
the level and the variance of schooling contribute to a significant portion of earnings 
disparity. Assuming all estimated parameters to be constant over the years and equal to 
their corresponding 2016 estimates, to assess the effect of each independent variable, the 
five partial derivatives derived in Table 1 are calculated based on the estimated results of 
equation (11). 
 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ ൌ 0.092      𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ ൌ െ0.00002    𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜇ௌ ൌ 0.021 𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝜇஺ ൌ 0.001     𝜕𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑌ሻሿ𝜕𝑅஺ௌ ൌ 0.132 
 
     Schooling affects income inequality through three channels. First, with the 
expansion of higher education, more workers have received tertiary education nowadays. 
This would result in a more unequal distribution of labor earnings as a higher level of 
schooling is associated with a larger diversity (of something?) in terms of curriculum and 
quality. Given that there are different learning abilities and returns to education of workers, 
the impact on income inequality would be greater with an increasing level of schooling. 
From the partial derivative calculated above, a unit increase in schooling will raise income 
inequality by 0.021 points. On the other hand, as observed from the data, the increase in 
average schooling over the years is remarkable. It had risen by 4.58 years, from 7.52 years 
in 1981 to 12.1 years in 2016. According to our model, this would translate to an increase 
in income inequality over the period by 0.096 points, or about 22.4%. 
 
     Although education inflation itself would lead to a higher level of income inequality, 
compulsory education launched by the Hong Kong government since 1971 may have 
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offered another channel to narrow the income gap. Promoting mandatory education not 
only guarantees students a minimum level of education but also helps to reduce the 
dispersion of years of schooling received by workers, and thereby narrows the distribution 
of productivity. As a result, income inequality can be eased by subsidizing free and 
compulsory education up to a certain level. In 1978, the government extended the universal 
basic education from primary school level (6 years) to junior secondary school level (9 
years). 30 years later, education services have been named as one of Hong Kong’s six 
priority industries with the aim to enhance Hong Kong’s position as a regional education 
hub. The government therefore further extended the free education to senior secondary 
school level (12 years) in 2008 to show its commitment towards nurturing talents to support 
the growth of the economy and reinforcing Hong Kong’s competitiveness. With these two 
waves of expansion, the standard deviation of schooling has dropped from 4.21 years in 
1981 to 3.97 years in 1996. By 2016, it further declined to 3.78 years. This observed 
decrease in the standard deviation of schooling from 1981 to 2016 has contributed to a 
decrease in the variance of the log of income by 0.039 points. Given that the net change in 
the variance of log-income between 1981 and 2016 is 0.093 points, this channel has played 
an important role in alleviating income inequality.  
 
     The third channel for schooling to affect income inequality comes from the negative 
correlation between age and schooling. Since the expansion of schooling benefits younger 
and less experienced workers, the stronger the secular upward trend in schooling, the 
greater its impact is on narrowing the income gap. Over the sample period, the correlation 
has decreased from -0.344 in 1981 to -0.427 in 2016, indicating a moderate secular upward 
trend in schooling. In fact, this channel is responsible for a decrease of 0.011 points in the 
variance of log-income, which is about 11.8% of the net change in income inequality over 
the period. 
 
     On the other hand, population ageing also affects earnings disparity among the 
workforce via two channels. Firstly, since age is a proxy for one’s potential work 
experience, the older the worker, the more potential post-school training he has acquired, 
holding the level of schooling constant. In this sense, population ageing itself would 
exacerbate income inequality because an older age group is usually associated with a higher 
within-group inequality than a younger one. For young workers, their distribution of 
income is in general more compressed as they do not have much work experience to 
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differentiate their productivity from each other. The labor market of the young workforce 
is therefore more competitive, resulting in a less dispersed wage distribution. In contrast, 
even though the starting salaries among young workers are similar regardless of job choice, 
the subsequent career paths and promotion opportunities differ significantly from job to 
job. Inequality among the elderly and more experienced workers is thus higher as the 
trajectories of their lifetime income diverge. Hence, given that the return to post-school 
training varies across workers of different gender and those working in different industries, 
its effect on income inequality would be larger as the average age of the workforce goes 
up. Quantitatively, the mean age of the workforce has increased from 38.51 years in 1981 
to 43.62 years in 2016. This has led to a slight increase in income inequality by 0.007 points. 
 
     Secondly, the age composition of the workforce as reflected by the variance of age, 
in principle can also affect the extent of income disparity. Intuitively, a society which 
consists of a 50-year-old experienced worker and a 20-year-old young worker should have 
a more unequal income distribution as compared to a society with two 30-year-old workers. 
This is because age is positively correlated with work experience, and work experience 
determines one’s labor market earnings. Therefore, with a more extreme age distribution, 
the level of income inequality should also be higher. However, as mentioned above, young 
people in general have more schooling than their elder counterparts. The upward secular 
trend of education causes a negative correlation between age and schooling, resulting in a 
negative impact of the variance of age on income inequality. With these two counteracting 
forces, the resulting partial effect of a unit change in the standard deviation of age on the 
variance of log-income is -0.00002. In other words, the two effects have completely offset 
each other, leading to a trivial impact of the variance of age on income distribution.  
 
     Tables 3A and 3B show the predicted change in income inequality among the 
workforce for the pre-handover period (1981 – 1996) and the post-handover period (2001 
– 2016) respectively. By looking into the contribution of each component to the change in 
income inequality, it is revealed that the majority of the predicted change is contributed by 
the increase in the average level of schooling, while the decrease in the variance of 
schooling has offset some of its effect. Although the age composition of the workforce also 
plays a role in determining income inequality, the effects are relatively small. Before the 
transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to Mainland China, the model predicts that income 
inequality would rise by 0.032 points, from 0.429 in 1981 to 0.461 in 1996. Compared to 
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the realized value of 0.471, the gap between the observed and the predicted income 
inequality is reasonably small. Similarly, given the actual changes of the demographic 
variables, the model also predicts accurately over the post-handover period. The predicted 
change in the variance of the log of earnings between 2001 and 2016 is 0.017. Comparing 
it with the corresponding actual change during the same period, the model accounts for 
about 68% of the changes. 
 
Table 3A: Comparison of predicted income inequality (Pre-handover period) 
 1981 1996 1996 – 1981 Contribution to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ 4.21 3.97 -0.24 -0.0218 𝑆̅ 7.52 10.10 2.58 0.0548 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ 10.95 9.54 -1.42 0.0003 ?̅? 38.51 39.37 0.85 0.0013 𝑅஺ௌ -0.344 -0.364 -0.02 -0.0026 
Predicted difference    +0.032 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿଵଽ଼ଵ    0.429 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿଵଽଽ଺෣     0.461 
 
Table 3B: Comparison of predicted income inequality (Post-handover period) 
 2001 2016 2016 – 2001 Contribution to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ 3.94 3.78 -0.16 -0.0148 𝑆̅ 10.50 12.09 1.59 0.0337 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ 9.36 10.85 1.50 -0.0004 ?̅? 40.09 43.62 3.53 0.0052 
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𝑅஺ௌ -0.376 -0.427 -0.05 -0.0067 
Predicted difference    +0.017 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿଶ଴଴ଵ    0.497 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿଶ଴ଵ଺෣     0.514 
 
With an established quantitative relationship between the demographic variables and 
income inequality, we proceed to project the workforce structure for the years of 2021, 
2026 and 2031, and forecast the changes in income inequality for the next 15 years. Before 
making the true out-of-sample forecasts, pseudo out-of-sample forecasts for the years of 
2006, 2011 and 2016 are made using the 2001 Population Census 5%-sample dataset as a 
base to extrapolate the changes in the composition of the workforce. Applying the 
procedures outlined in Section 4, Table 4 reports the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of the 
variance of the log of main employment income. 
 
Table 4: Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts on the variance of log-income 
 2006 2011 2016 
 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ 3.96 0.0018 3.93 -0.0028 3.83 -0.0092 𝑆̅ 10.90 0.0085 11.43 0.0112 12.05 0.0132 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ 9.67 -0.0001 10.28 -0.0001 10.70 -0.0001 ?̅? 41.71 0.0024 42.65 0.0014 43.11 0.0007 𝑅஺ௌ -0.383 -0.0009 -0.403 -0.0027 -0.416 -0.0024 
Predicted 
difference 
 +0.0117  +0.0071  +0.0022 
𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ்ିହ෣   0.497  0.509  0.516 
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𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ෣   0.509  0.516  0.518 
 
The observed values of the variance of the log of main employment income for 2006, 
2011 and 2016 are 0.509, 0.514 and 0.522 respectively. Comparing them with the 
corresponding forecasted values reported in Table 4, we found that the human capital 
model is able to generate accurate forecasts over a 15-year horizon. While the magnitude 
of the forecast errors increases with the length of the forecast horizon, the forecasts of the 
variance of log-income generated based on the demographic projection for 2016 are still 
very close to their realized values, with errors below 1%. The accuracy achieved by the 
model suggests that the effects on income inequality contributed by determinants other 
than the workforce structure are relatively stable. On the other hand, it also justifies the use 
of this methodology to make true out-of-sample forecasts to shed light on future evolutions 
of income inequality. Table 5 reports the true out-of-sample forecasts of the variance of 
log-income using the same extrapolation method. 
 
Table 5: True out-of-sample forecasts on the variance of log-income 
 2021 2026 2031 
 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 
Projected 
value 
Contribution 
to change in 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ 𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ 3.65 -0.012 3.39 -0.0239 3.08 -0.0285 𝑆̅ 12.61 0.011 13.25 0.0136 13.80 0.0117 𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ 11.06 -0.0001 10.86 -0.0001 10.50 -0.0001 ?̅? 44.14 0.0008 44.40 0.0004 44.92 0.0008 𝑅஺ௌ -0.439 -0.0016 -0.449 -0.0012 -0.456 -0.0011 
Predicted 
difference 
 -0.0018  -0.0111  -0.0171 
𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ்ିହ෣   0.522  0.520  0.509 𝜎ଶሾlnሺ𝑦ሻሿ෣   0.520  0.509  0.492 
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     Based on the extrapolated workforce structure, the variance of log-income is 
expected to decline gradually in the next 15 years. In 2021, the average level of schooling 
of the workforce will increase to 12.61 years, as compared to 12.09 years in 2016. This 
would lead to an increase in the variance of log-income by 0.011 points. On the other hand, 
the standard deviation of schooling is also expected to decrease from 3.78 years in 2016 to 
3.65 years in 2021. This would lead to a decrease in income inequality by 0.012 points. In 
other words, the positive effect on income inequality caused by the increase in the average 
level of schooling will be completely offset by the negative effect exerted by the decrease 
in the dispersion of schooling. While an ageing working population will lead to a slight 
increase of income inequality by 0.0008 points, this effect is also canceled out by the 
corresponding negative effects caused by the decrease in the standard deviation in age and 
the correlation between age and schooling. As a result, it is forecasted that there will be a 
small decrease in income inequality from 0.522 points in 2016 to 0.520 points in 2021.  
In 2026, although the average level of schooling will rise to 13.25 years, its effect on 
income inequality will be overweighed by the compression of the distribution of schooling. 
Moreover, the correlation between age and schooling among the workforce will decrease 
further to -0.449, which also strengthens the downward pressure on earnings disparity. This 
suggests that the government can expand higher education and narrow the income gap at 
the same time, given that the rise in education is universal and benefits young workers 
more. As the age structure of the workforce does not exert a significant impact on the 
distribution of earnings, the educational structure will dominate the change in the variance 
of the log-income, resulting in a net decrease in income inequality to 0.509 points in 2026. 
The extrapolated workforce structure reveals that the demographic trends described 
above will continue till 2031. The average level of schooling will increase to 13.8 years, 
while its standard deviation will decrease to 3.08 years. With the secular upward trend in 
education, the correlation between age and education will keep on decreasing to -0.456, 
but the pace of the decrease will be slower as compared to that in previous years. This can 
be reconciled by the fact that most of the less educated workers will be retired by 2031. 
Therefore, old and experienced workers by that time will be relatively highly educated. 
Moreover, the fertility rate in Hong Kong has been low during the entire post-handover 
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period.22  This will eventually result in a relatively small proportion of young people 
joining the workforce by the year 2031. Hence, the correlation between age and schooling 
among the workforce may eventually converge and fluctuate around a certain level, and its 
effect of easing earnings disparity will vanish in the long run. Again, population ageing 
will continue, and the average age among the workforce will rise to 44.92 years, with a 
standard deviation of 10.5 years. Although the combined effect of the change in age 
structure will exacerbate income inequality, its impact will be overweighed by the 
downward pressure caused by the expansion of educational structure. Thus, the forecasted 
variance of log-income will decrease to 0.492 points in 2031, which is a level comparable 
to that in 2001. 
 
6. Forecasts of Other Income Inequality Indices 
     Instead of the variance of the log of main employment income, income inequality is 
usually reported in terms of the Gini coefficient. In this section, the baseline Mincerian 
earnings function derived in Section 3 is used to forecast a set of standard income inequality 
indices, including those reported in Table 2, for the next 15 years up to 2031. Pseudo out-
of-sample forecasts for the years of 2001, 2006 and 2011 are reported to check the 
performance of the model. In addition, a modified version of the earnings function is also 
estimated to compare with the baseline model and determine if the accuracy can be 
improved by adding other control variables. The enhanced earnings function is specified 
below: 
lnሺ𝑌௜ሻ  ൌ 𝛿଴ ൅ 𝛿ଵ𝑆 ൅ 𝛿ଶ𝑇 ൅ 𝛿ଷ𝑇ଶ ൅ 𝛿ସ𝑈𝑆 ൈ 𝑆 ൅ 𝛿ହ𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑔 ൈ 𝑆 ൅ 𝛿଺𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 ൈ 𝑆൅ 𝛿଻𝑃𝐺 ൈ 𝑆 ൅ 𝛿଼𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൅ 𝛿ଽ𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑆 ൅ 𝛿ଵ଴𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑇൅ 𝑢௜                      ሺ13ሻ 
where 𝑈𝑆 , 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑔 , 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒  and 𝑃𝐺  are dummy variables with 1 indicating the 
highest educational attainment being upper secondary school, non-degree post-secondary 
                                                            
22  The total fertility rate in Hong Kong has fluctuated at around 1.2 in the post‐handover period, which is 
consistently below the replacement level of 2.1. In particular, the economic recession from 1998 to 2003 
discouraged women from giving birth to children, leading to the record low total fertility rate of 0.931 in 
the early 2000s, as revealed by the 2001 Hong Kong Population Census.   
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education, college degree and postgraduate degree respectively. 𝐹𝑒𝑚 is a gender dummy 
with 1 representing female and 0 indicating male. 
     Compared to equation (10), equation (13) allows for a non-linear effect of years of 
schooling on one’s employment earnings. Besides, a gender dummy is also incorporated 
to account for the earnings gap between males and females. Two interactive terms, 𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ𝑆 and 𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑇, enable males and females to have different returns to education and 
returns to work experience. The estimation results of equation (10) and equation (13) are 
reported in Table 6. 
 
     With all the coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level, the estimation 
results derived from equation (10) show that the coefficients of the independent variables 
were stable over the period between 2001 and 2016, except schooling, which increased 
slightly from 0.1191 to 0.1251. On the other hand, the enhanced earnings function implies 
that returns to education increase with one’s level of schooling. In 2016, the average returns 
to an additional year of schooling for male high school graduates, non-degree post-
secondary education diploma holders, college graduates and postgraduate degree holders 
were 4.94%, 6.9%, 7.85% and 9.51% respectively. Moreover, it is also revealed that 
females were in general earning less than males in the labor market. In equation (13), the 
female dummy affects lnሺ𝑌ሻ via three channels. Firstly, via the direct effect of the gender 
dummy, the lnሺ𝑌ሻ of a female worker is on average lower than a male worker by 0.212, 
which is equivalent to a decline in main employment income by 19.1%, ceteris paribus. 
Secondly, females are more efficient school learners than males, as reflected by the positive 
coefficient of the interactive term 𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑆 . The better quality of formal schooling 
received by females would enable them to earn more in the labor market. Thirdly, females 
do not benefit as much as males in terms of work experience, despite the fact that the 
difference has narrowed over time. In 2001, the coefficient of work experience for males 
is 0.0545, but that for females is 0.049, with a difference of 0.0055. In 2016, those for 
males and females rose to 0.0549 and 0.0516 respectively, with the difference declining to 
0.0033. The lower returns to work experience for females can probably be explained by 
the fact that there are chances for women to be pregnant. Not only pregnant women are 
eligible for a paid maternity leave in Hong Kong, they often spend greater portions of their 
time at home rather than engaging in marketplace production activities after giving birth. 
Thus, women on average are paid less in a competitive market. Nevertheless, as women 
usually have a comparative advantage in the service sector, the rise of the tertiary sector 
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since the post-handover period has facilitated the increase in relative wage and market work 
hours of women, which in turn mitigates the earnings disparity between males and females 
(Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017). 
After estimating the coefficients of equation (10) and equation (13), the next step is 
to obtain the fitted value and the error term for each observation in the base year sample. 
The 5%-samples of 2001 Hong Kong Population Census and 2016 Hong Kong Population 
By-census are adopted to be the base year sample dataset for the pseudo out-of-sample 
forecasts and the true out-of-sample forecasts respectively. The error terms are assumed to 
follow a normal distribution where the mean and variance are constant within but different 
across age and educational groups over the forecast horizon.23 After that, we apply the 
procedures specified in Section 4 to project and simulate the workforce structure for the 
forecasted years. With the simulated datasets, equation (10) and equation (13) are used 
separately to predict the log-income earned by each simulated individual. An error term is 
then drawn from the respective distribution and added to the predicted log-income to arrive 
at the simulated log-income. Finally, by taking the exponential of the simulated log-income 
for each simulated observation, the whole simulated distribution of labor earnings can be 
obtained, and the income inequality indices can be calculated accordingly. 
Tables 7 and 8 report the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts and true out-of-sample 
forecasts for the Gini coefficient, Theil index, Atkinson index, the variance of log-income, 
the 90th percentile to 50th percentile income ratio and the 50th percentile to 10th percentile 
income ratio. By comparing the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts with their corresponding 
realized values shown in Table 2, it reveals that the forecasted indices simulated by the 
enhanced earnings function (13) tend to deviate less from the observed figures. 
Nevertheless, all the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts generated by the baseline earnings 
function (10) are still reasonably close to the corresponding realized values. This implies 
that the projection and simulation methods adopted are useful in simulating the evolution 
of income distribution in future years. For the true out-of-sample forecasts, it is again 
predicted that the overall earnings disparity among the working population will be 
alleviated in the next 15 years. Based on the forecasts derived from the enhanced model, 
the Gini coefficient will decrease from 0.443 in 2021 to 0.435 in 2026, and it will further 
decrease to 0.429 in 2031. The Theil index and Atkinson index will also decrease from 
0.368 to 0.341 and 0.276 to 0.253 respectively during the same period. For the 90th 
                                                            
23  The distributions of the error terms can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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percentile to 10th percentile income ratio, it is forecasted that it will decrease from 6.24 in 
2021 to 5.84 in 2031. All the decreasing trends of income inequality indices are consistent 
with the patterns exhibited by the forecasts yielded by the baseline earnings function. In 
other words, the human capital approach suggests that earnings disparity among the 
workforce will ease naturally as the demographic structure evolves. (In particular the 
decrease in the dispersion of schooling) 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation of equation (10) and equation (13) 
Dependent 
variable: lnሺ𝑌ሻ 2001 (𝑁 ൌ 125,081) 2016 (𝑁 ൌ 145,400) 
 Equation (10) Equation (13) Equation (10) Equation (13) 
Constant 7.8246 
(0.0112) 
8.4036 
(0.0134) 
7.8226 
(0.0098) 
8.6699 
(0.0138) 𝑆 0.1191 
(0.0005) 
0.0151 
(0.0011) 
0.1251 
(0.0005) 
0.0163 
(0.0013) 𝑇 0.0307 
(0.0006) 
0.0545 
(0.0007) 
0.0297 
(0.0005) 
0.0549 
(0.0005) 𝑇ଶ -0.0004 
(0.00001) 
-0.0009 
(0.00001) 
-0.0003 
(0.00001) 
-0.0008 
(0.00001) 𝑈𝑆 ൈ 𝑆  0.0319 
(0.0005) 
 0.0331 
(0.0005) 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑔 ൈ 𝑆  0.0528 
(0.0007) 
 0.0527 
(0.0006) 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 ൈ 𝑆  0.063 
(0.0007) 
 0.0622 
(0.0007) 𝑃𝐺 ൈ 𝑆  0.0758 
(0.0008) 
 0.0788 
(0.0007) 
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𝐹𝑒𝑚  -0.262 
(0.0189) 
 -0.212 
(0.0178) 𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑆  0.074 
(0.0011) 
 0.0096 
(0.001) 𝐹𝑒𝑚 ൈ 𝑇  -0.0055 
(0.0004) 
 -0.0033 
(0.0003) 
Adjusted 𝑅ଶ  0.3302 0.4089 0.3396 0.4137 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts of income inequality measures 
Inequality Index Equation (10) Equation (13) 
 2006 2011 2016 2006 2011 2016 
Gini coefficient 0.438 0.443 0.452 0.434 0.439 0.446 
Theil index 0.359 0.367 0.378 0.345 0.352 0.366 
Atkinson index 0.263 0.276 0.289 0.255 0.269 0.281 
Variance of log-
income 
0.504 0.511 0.515 0.512 0.520 0.527 
P90/P50 3.124 3.158 3.196 3.015 3.052 3.116 
P50/P10 2.245 2.266 2.289 2.024 2.053 2.088 
 
 
Table 8: True out-of-sample forecasts of income inequality measures 
Inequality Index Equation (10) Equation (13) 
 2021 2026 2031 2021 2026 2031 
Gini coefficient 0.448 0.441 0.436 0.443 0.435 0.429 
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Theil index 0.373 0.362 0.356 0.368 0.355 0.341 
Atkinson index 0.281 0.272 0.264 0.276 0.268 0.253 
Variance of log-
income 
0.517 0.505 0.486 0.523 0.512 0.494 
P90/P50 3.146 3.118 3.072 3.045 2.980 2.955 
P50/P10 2.183 2.167 2.125 2.048 2.027 1.975 
 
7. Conclusion 
     Economic inequality has long been a polarizing issue in many countries, often 
drawing community-wide debates and special attention from policymakers. While plenty 
of studies have been conducted over the last few decades to provide ex post analyses on 
the causes of economic inequality, little effort has been devoted to ex ante forecasts of how 
income inequality will evolve over time. This paper provides a first attempt in the literature 
to forecast the future evolution of income inequality with the demographic projections. 
Since the lack of suitable time series data has prohibited the application of a conventional 
time series forecasting approach, we follow the human capital approach presented by 
Chiswick and Mincer (1972) to analyze the change in income inequality among the 
workforce aged 25 – 64 with a positive main employment income (excluding foreign 
domestic helpers). The model relates income inequality measured by the variance of log-
income to the distribution of schooling, age and the intercorrelation between them. Results 
show that the rise in income inequality during the period between 1981 and 2016 is mainly 
caused by an increase in the average level of schooling, whereas population ageing has 
only played a limited role in influencing the income distribution. 
 
While education inflation itself would exacerbate income inequality among the 
working population, it is counteracted by a fall in the dispersion of schooling over time 
stemmed from the implementation of the compulsory education scheme by the government. 
The latter turned out to be an important tool to mitigate earnings disparity. By projecting 
and extrapolating the demographic structure of the workforce, the model employed in this 
study forecasts that the standard deviation of schooling will decrease from 3.78 years in 
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2016 to 3.08 years in 2031. This will lead to an effect large enough to reverse the increasing 
trend of income inequality from 2016 onwards. 
 
     In addition to analyzing the change in income inequality in terms of the variance of 
the log-income, this paper also provides forecasts of a list of standard income inequality 
indices, including the Gini coefficient, Theil index, Atkinson index and the 90th percentile 
to 10th percentile income ratio. By simulating the whole income distribution for the years 
of 2021, 2026 and 2031 based on the projected workforce structure, we find that all 
forecasted indices derived from the baseline earnings function and the enhanced earnings 
function exhibit decreasing trends. In particular, based on the enhanced model, the Gini 
coefficient on individuals’ earnings are forecasted to be 0.443, 0.435 and 0.429 in 2021, 
2026 and 2031 respectively. These results suggest that earnings disparity among the 
working population will ease naturally with the evolution of demographic structure in 
Hong Kong. 
 
     Economic inequality is a complex topic that requires comprehensive analysis. While 
this paper only focuses on the quantitative effects of education expansion and population 
ageing on income inequality among the working population, future studies may extend the 
investigation to the effects of policy changes, such as tax reforms, social welfare and 
immigration policies on economic inequality. The forecast of household-level income 
inequality will also be an interesting extension of this paper, given that the decreasing 
trends in both marriage rate and household size in Hong Kong and other developed 
economies. If suitable longitudinal data are available in the future, one may also study and 
forecast the changes in intergenerational mobility over time. In short, this paper provides a 
first attempt to make use of demographic projections for analyzing income inequality. To 
alleviate economic inequality and promote social mobility, the government should spend 
more resources on conducting longitudinal surveys and developing more informative 
datasets, so that future socioeconomic policies can be more evidence-based and better 
informed. 
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Appendix 
A1. Estimation results of equation (11) by gender and industry 
Male  𝛽଴  𝛽ଵ  𝛽ଶ  𝑅ଶ  𝑁 
Manufacturing 8.238 
(0.0565) 
0.104 
(0.0031) 
0.014 
(0.0009) 
0.241 3,695 
Construction 8.485 
(0.0263) 
0.092 
(0.0015) 
0.012 
(0.0004) 
0.235 12,763 
Import/export trade and 
wholesale 
8.075 
(0.0414) 
0.116 
(0.0023) 
0.020 
(0.0006) 
0.226 8,881 
Retail, accommodation and food 
services 
8.438 
(0.0294) 
0.086 
(0.0018) 
0.013 
(0.0005) 
0.165 11,183 
Transportation, storage and 
courier services 
8.582 
(0.0292) 
0.085 
(0.0017) 
0.005 
(0.0004) 
0.223 11,132 
Information and communication 7.560 
(0.0615) 
0.145 
(0.0035) 
0.026 
(0.0009) 
0.305 4,338 
Financing, insurance real estate, 
professional and business 
services 
7.395 
(0.0389) 
0.172 
(0.0021) 
0.018 
(0.0005) 
0.341 13,872 
Public administration, social and 
personal services 
7.952 
(0.0298) 
0.135 
(0.0016) 
0.014 
(0.0004) 
0.355 14,460 
Other industries 8.234 
(0.1248) 
0.115 
(0.0062) 
0.014 
(0.0021) 
0.373 665 
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A1. Continued 
Female 𝛽଴  𝛽ଵ  𝛽ଶ  𝑅ଶ  𝑁 
Manufacturing 8.249 
(0.0701) 
0.098 
(0.0038) 
0.009 
(0.0011) 
0.269 2,402 
Construction 8.520 
(0.0802) 
0.088 
(0.0043) 
0.007 
(0.0014) 
0.286 1,530 
Import/export trade and 
wholesale 
7.924 
(0.0453) 
0.119 
(0.0026) 
0.015 
(0.0007) 
0.231 7,154 
Retail, accommodation and food 
services 
8.594 
(0.0252) 
0.072 
(0.0015) 
0.004 
(0.0004) 
0.190 13,959 
Transportation, storage and 
courier services 
7.986 
(0.0631) 
0.115 
(0.0036) 
0.012 
(0.0009) 
0.272 3,163 
Information and communication 7.314 
(0.105) 
0.155 
(0.0060) 
0.027 
(0.0014) 
0.300 1,702 
Financing, insurance real estate, 
professional and business 
services 
7.433 
(0.0420) 
0.163 
(0.0023) 
0.016 
(0.0006) 
0.303 12,549 
Public administration, social and 
personal services 
7.843 
(0.0233) 
0.134 
(0.0012) 
0.012 
(0.0004) 
0.426 21,714 
Other industries 8.163 
(0.2408) 
0.104 
(0.0122) 
0.012 
(0.0042) 
0.285 238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
A2. Data on the mean and standard deviation of age and schooling and their correlation 
Year 𝐴  𝜎ሺ𝐴ሻ  𝑆  𝜎ሺ𝑆ሻ  𝑅஺ௌ 
1981 38.51 10.95 7.52 4.21 -0.344 
1986 38.62 10.71 8.22 4.10 -0.362 
1991 38.98 10.21 9.15 4.09 -0.363 
1996 39.37 9.54 10.10 3.97 -0.364 
2001 40.09 9.36 10.50 3.94 -0.376 
2006 41.17 9.56 11.03 3.82 -0.379 
2011 42.53 10.30 11.58 3.80 -0.419 
2016 43.62 10.85 12.09 3.78 -0.427 
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A3. Workforce participation rate by gender, age and education group, 2001 – 2016 
2001    Male     
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
77.37% 80.23% 82.02% 82.84% 80.12% 75.34% 62.50% 38.19% 
Upper 
Secondary 
87.61% 89.77% 90.45% 89.47% 87.67% 80.98% 70.47% 43.85% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
94.33% 94.31% 94.24% 94.30% 91.99% 86.36% 71.89% 47.88% 
College 90.14% 93.36% 93.11% 94.62% 92.80% 86.88% 74.69% 49.69% 
Postgraduate 85.89% 95.72% 93.85% 93.88% 96.34% 90.36% 81.82% 67.61% 
 
2001   Ever-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
37.33% 33.98% 34.40% 40.04% 43.90% 35.17% 22.73% 9.21% 
Upper 
Secondary 
73.94% 69.07% 62.85% 57.10% 55.36% 45.75% 29.23% 13.22% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
83.78% 80.22% 77.42% 73.52% 63.32% 61.02% 44.50% 14.74% 
College 81.08% 79.84% 73.75% 68.42% 63.97% 61.30% 45.85% 23.13% 
Postgraduate 72.29% 82.67% 79.92% 82.04% 77.67% 82.46% 42.86% 25.00% 
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A3. Continued 
2001   Never-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 39 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
64.03% 65.42% 68.59% 62.98% 60.67% 43.78% 38.71% 18.00% 
Upper 
Secondary 
87.64% 86.62% 86.71% 85.23% 79.63% 69.46% 40.82% 23.81% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
93.74% 90.53% 93.33% 85.94% 84.34% 90.00% 76.47% 16.67% 
College 92.61% 92.56% 90.66% 88.07% 88.62% 66.67% 75.00% 33.33% 
Postgraduate 86.92% 91.94% 92.48% 90.00% 95.65% 92.31% 100.00% 33.33% 
 
2006    Male     
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
77.67% 79.90% 79.73% 81.44% 79.29% 74.69% 58.42% 36.31% 
Upper 
Secondary 
84.08% 88.94% 88.42% 89.01% 86.38% 80.51% 63.08% 41.65% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
88.73% 91.53% 91.42% 90.93% 87.42% 84.36% 63.33% 37.15% 
College 89.82% 92.67% 91.44% 91.68% 87.92% 83.43% 66.89% 45.02% 
Postgraduate 84.76% 94.59% 93.42% 93.40% 89.45% 86.79% 68.42% 55.45% 
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A3. Continued 
2006   Ever-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
37.93% 40.62% 39.68% 41.92% 43.10% 38.52% 24.89% 10.13% 
Upper 
Secondary 
64.77% 67.96% 62.61% 59.96% 55.84% 47.30% 28.65% 15.02% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
74.04% 81.42% 69.74% 72.48% 60.38% 57.34% 31.94% 16.49% 
College 80.59% 79.31% 73.49% 72.32% 63.52% 61.30% 42.30% 23.81% 
Postgraduate 74.76% 83.05% 78.87% 80.59% 77.27% 70.83% 37.35% 61.11% 
 
2006   Never-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
65.26% 62.53% 57.81% 64.30% 55.16% 49.89% 31.05% 19.35% 
Upper 
Secondary 
84.40% 84.62% 81.62% 80.11% 72.27% 69.69% 48.42% 27.91% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
91.94% 86.69% 81.40% 80.07% 83.56% 67.16% 43.75% 38.46% 
College 90.38% 90.24% 88.74% 80.52% 80.33% 65.18% 48.98% 32.14% 
Postgraduate 86.95% 90.72% 90.31% 91.30% 91.09% 68.57% 55.00% 41.67% 
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A3. Continued 
2011    Male     
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
67.07% 75.25% 77.20% 79.42% 80.96% 78.33% 67.09% 45.64% 
Upper 
Secondary 
82.59% 87.25% 87.45% 86.84% 86.00% 84.49% 70.37% 47.34% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
87.30% 92.83% 91.34% 90.78% 91.74% 87.21% 76.16% 43.19% 
College 88.94% 93.87% 93.50% 90.78% 89.59% 88.46% 73.05% 50.71% 
Postgraduate 84.20% 94.01% 95.74% 94.29% 93.03% 89.25% 83.27% 63.92% 
 
2011   Ever-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
27.35% 31.24% 39.63% 45.41% 47.93% 41.29% 31.25% 15.85% 
Upper 
Secondary 
59.72% 63.80% 62.15% 60.80% 59.24% 53.53% 41.01% 19.49% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
74.52% 72.09% 71.12% 71.01% 69.33% 62.44% 50.24% 16.43% 
College 77.84% 79.08% 77.13% 74.03% 72.00% 68.87% 53.70% 21.03% 
Postgraduate 74.23% 83.63% 83.02% 79.60% 79.50% 79.58% 62.33% 33.33% 
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A3. Continued 
2011   Never-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
49.73% 54.28% 52.75% 57.93% 58.35% 54.28% 47.19% 27.85% 
Upper 
Secondary 
80.91% 85.11% 82.30% 78.38% 75.52% 71.83% 52.70% 23.43% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
87.38% 88.70% 87.08% 84.54% 76.50% 75.18% 54.79% 32.43% 
College 91.80% 91.78% 91.77% 89.33% 87.13% 75.00% 65.75% 25.00% 
Postgraduate 86.99% 90.48% 92.71% 92.75% 89.27% 81.25% 81.82% 46.15% 
 
2016    Male     
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
74.49% 78.64% 80.49% 82.24% 81.90% 78.92% 73.50% 57.59% 
Upper 
Secondary 
81.56% 85.61% 86.61% 88.19% 85.68% 85.00% 77.67% 55.45% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
83.68% 90.05% 88.97% 89.13% 86.65% 85.59% 78.83% 55.92% 
College 86.80% 92.24% 92.45% 91.59% 89.02% 86.90% 79.12% 57.19% 
Postgraduate 80.70% 92.62% 94.17% 93.67% 90.27% 89.47% 82.40% 61.80% 
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A3. Continued 
2016   Ever-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
25.80% 29.11% 36.86% 48.21% 51.77% 47.73% 38.80% 23.19% 
Upper 
Secondary 
45.84% 53.65% 57.16% 58.88% 60.73% 57.90% 46.83% 29.28% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
60.47% 67.90% 64.34% 62.85% 67.51% 66.87% 48.73% 28.96% 
College 74.69% 76.67% 76.38% 70.27% 72.29% 67.76% 56.65% 31.58% 
Postgraduate 81.08% 81.42% 78.71% 79.10% 79.68% 73.74% 63.42% 45.75% 
 
2016   Never-married Female    
 25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
47.64% 60.37% 57.94% 59.66% 47.76% 55.15% 48.47% 36.94% 
Upper 
Secondary 
78.94% 79.67% 79.90% 77.81% 72.01% 69.13% 57.65% 35.57% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
83.50% 84.28% 88.45% 79.01% 74.40% 72.39% 66.29% 31.52% 
College 85.03% 89.57% 87.86% 87.64% 80.92% 71.24% 52.51% 31.18% 
Postgraduate 82.57% 85.66% 90.42% 88.48% 82.57% 77.21% 65.59% 45.65% 
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A4. Projected and realized female marriage rate by age and education group, 2006 – 2031 
Projected 
2006 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
63.43% 85.37% 89.22% 92.09% 92.44% 95.25% 98.47% 99.14% 
Upper 
Secondary 
37.98% 65.68% 77.29% 82.07% 84.79% 87.45% 94.24% 94.97% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
26.49% 59.58% 70.04% 76.23% 77.28% 84.88% 88.12% 91.21% 
College 20.81% 54.35% 69.32% 73.30% 77.41% 84.31% 89.96% 94.23% 
Postgraduate 22.50% 53.19% 70.25% 69.63% 71.04% 78.36% 79.23% 81.60% 
 
Realized 
2006 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
62.63% 84.70% 89.82% 91.08% 92.99% 95.01% 96.25% 98.60% 
Upper 
Secondary 
34.42% 65.68% 78.46% 83.40% 86.31% 88.99% 90.69% 95.23% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
24.11% 58.35% 72.83% 75.00% 79.97% 84.60% 85.71% 93.72% 
College 19.35% 54.59% 69.69% 74.53% 75.39% 78.79% 87.11% 90.00% 
Postgraduate 21.19% 55.00% 69.24% 69.74% 70.55% 77.42% 80.58% 80.00% 
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A4. Continued 
Projected 
2011 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
59.82% 84.60% 88.03% 90.82% 90.31% 93.63% 98.36% 99.28% 
Upper 
Secondary 
32.89% 61.62% 75.04% 79.42% 81.87% 84.28% 93.73% 93.46% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
23.36% 58.25% 68.18% 73.79% 75.20% 83.24% 84.42% 88.36% 
College 17.93% 51.12% 68.30% 71.30% 75.99% 79.89% 86.65% 92.55% 
Postgraduate 22.05% 50.32% 70.86% 68.80% 69.95% 75.29% 77.69% 79.00% 
 
Realized 
2011 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
60.59% 84.08% 90.91% 92.84% 92.60% 94.00% 95.61% 96.90% 
Upper 
Secondary 
34.13% 62.25% 75.72% 82.37% 84.40% 87.27% 89.83% 91.17% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.47% 54.55% 71.17% 77.70% 80.85% 82.80% 85.31% 90.51% 
College 16.75% 52.85% 68.74% 75.32% 76.39% 77.60% 85.16% 88.27% 
Postgraduate 20.95% 53.54% 68.21% 68.60% 71.27% 74.74% 76.84% 78.69% 
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A4. Continued 
Projected 
2016 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
56.22% 83.83% 86.85% 89.56% 88.19% 92.02% 98.25% 99.42% 
Upper 
Secondary 
27.80% 57.56% 72.78% 76.77% 78.96% 81.10% 93.21% 91.96% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.23% 56.92% 66.32% 71.35% 73.13% 81.60% 80.72% 85.52% 
College 15.06% 47.88% 67.28% 69.29% 74.57% 75.48% 83.34% 90.88% 
Postgraduate 21.60% 47.45% 71.47% 67.96% 68.86% 72.21% 76.15% 76.39% 
 
 
Realized 
2016 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
59.04% 83.21% 90.88% 94.09% 93.03% 92.56% 93.41% 95.59% 
Upper 
Secondary 
33.73% 60.70% 74.13% 81.88% 83.57% 85.80% 86.99% 89.02% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.36% 52.44% 70.24% 77.30% 80.18% 80.73% 81.02% 88.77% 
College 16.13% 51.00% 68.12% 74.38% 76.45% 75.67% 82.90% 86.06% 
Postgraduate 20.40% 49.85% 67.87% 67.37% 70.32% 72.78% 73.43% 76.88% 
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A4. Continued 
Projected 
2021 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
57.48% 82.35% 90.85% 95.34% 93.46% 91.13% 91.21% 94.27% 
Upper 
Secondary 
33.33% 59.16% 72.55% 81.38% 82.75% 84.34% 84.14% 86.87% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.24% 50.33% 69.31% 76.90% 79.50% 78.66% 76.73% 87.03% 
College 15.52% 49.14% 67.50% 73.44% 76.52% 73.74% 80.63% 83.85% 
Postgraduate 19.85% 46.16% 67.53% 66.13% 69.37% 70.82% 70.02% 75.08% 
 
Projected 
2026 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
55.93% 81.48% 90.83% 96.59% 93.88% 89.69% 89.00% 92.96% 
Upper 
Secondary 
32.93% 57.62% 70.96% 80.89% 81.92% 82.88% 81.30% 84.72% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.13% 48.21% 68.38% 76.50% 78.83% 76.59% 72.43% 85.29% 
College 14.90% 47.29% 66.88% 72.50% 76.58% 71.82% 78.37% 81.63% 
Postgraduate 19.30% 42.47% 67.19% 64.90% 68.43% 68.86% 66.60% 73.28% 
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A4. Continued 
Projected 
2031 
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
54.38% 80.62% 90.80% 97.84% 94.31% 88.25% 86.80% 91.65% 
Upper 
Secondary 
32.53% 56.07% 69.37% 80.40% 81.10% 81.42% 78.46% 82.57% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.01% 46.10% 67.45% 76.10% 78.15% 74.52% 68.14% 83.55% 
College 14.28% 45.43% 66.26% 71.56% 76.64% 69.89% 76.11% 79.42% 
Postgraduate 18.75% 38.78% 66.84% 63.66% 67.48% 66.90% 63.19% 71.47% 
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A5. Projected and realized education structure by gender and age group, 2006 – 2031 
Projected 
2006 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
19.40% 23.25% 28.90% 36.32% 49.17% 59.18% 62.07% 65.43% 
Upper 
Secondary 
38.11% 38.19% 39.36% 38.12% 32.60% 27.22% 25.59% 21.10% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
12.93% 10.09% 8.90% 7.44% 5.63% 4.07% 3.79% 3.68% 
College 25.08% 23.26% 18.38% 13.40% 9.23% 7.05% 6.77% 8.34% 
Postgraduate 4.47% 5.21% 4.47% 4.72% 3.37% 2.49% 1.79% 1.46% 
 
Realized 
2006 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
18.39% 24.53% 29.50% 35.68% 48.49% 57.45% 62.36% 66.76% 
Upper 
Secondary 
41.66% 36.21% 37.36% 37.23% 32.00% 26.42% 25.30% 20.80% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
11.82% 9.94% 8.69% 7.57% 6.12% 5.16% 4.39% 3.96% 
College 23.68% 22.72% 17.31% 13.28% 8.79% 7.66% 5.65% 6.91% 
Postgraduate 4.46% 6.61% 7.15% 6.24% 4.59% 3.31% 2.31% 1.58% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2006 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
13.23% 23.61% 28.24% 37.92% 54.02% 67.45% 71.83% 74.95% 
Upper 
Secondary 
42.51% 39.25% 43.46% 44.28% 34.67% 23.87% 20.89% 15.97% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
12.97% 10.04% 8.63% 5.75% 3.73% 3.08% 2.76% 3.55% 
College 27.20% 22.33% 16.35% 9.73% 6.11% 4.45% 3.85% 5.07% 
Postgraduate 4.09% 4.77% 3.31% 2.32% 1.47% 1.14% 0.68% 0.44% 
 
Realized 
2006 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
13.71% 22.87% 29.21% 38.18% 54.48% 67.15% 72.07% 75.72% 
Upper 
Secondary 
42.38% 40.87% 43.07% 42.75% 32.94% 24.36% 19.93% 15.43% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
12.77% 9.19% 8.40% 6.48% 4.49% 3.30% 3.28% 3.54% 
College 26.95% 21.63% 14.98% 9.52% 5.98% 4.01% 3.71% 4.79% 
Postgraduate 4.20% 5.43% 4.33% 3.06% 2.11% 1.18% 1.01% 0.51% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2011 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
14.63% 17.60% 23.25% 28.90% 36.32% 49.17% 59.18% 62.07% 
Upper 
Secondary 
36.67% 37.03% 38.19% 39.36% 38.12% 32.60% 27.22% 25.59% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
14.63% 11.29% 10.09% 8.90% 7.44% 5.63% 4.07% 3.79% 
College 28.83% 28.14% 23.26% 18.38% 13.40% 9.23% 7.05% 6.77% 
Postgraduate 5.24% 5.95% 5.21% 4.47% 4.72% 3.37% 2.49% 1.79% 
 
Realized 
2011 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
11.97% 18.94% 25.14% 30.39% 35.66% 48.85% 59.66% 63.30% 
Upper 
Secondary 
37.27% 34.32% 33.88% 35.21% 36.71% 31.18% 24.56% 23.55% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
15.12% 12.67% 10.28% 9.36% 8.69% 6.99% 5.35% 4.98% 
College 29.31% 24.40% 20.75% 15.85% 11.11% 7.96% 6.63% 5.39% 
Postgraduate 6.32% 9.68% 9.95% 9.19% 7.82% 5.02% 3.79% 2.78% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2011 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
10.08% 18.97% 23.61% 28.24% 37.92% 54.02% 67.45% 71.83% 
Upper 
Secondary 
37.28% 35.04% 39.25% 43.46% 44.28% 34.67% 23.87% 20.89% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
14.15% 11.45% 10.04% 8.63% 5.75% 3.73% 3.08% 2.76% 
College 33.25% 28.31% 22.33% 16.35% 9.73% 6.11% 4.45% 3.85% 
Postgraduate 5.24% 6.23% 4.77% 3.31% 2.32% 1.47% 1.14% 0.68% 
 
Realized 
2011 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
9.55% 17.51% 26.24% 31.40% 38.45% 54.85% 68.61% 73.18% 
Upper 
Secondary 
35.09% 35.65% 37.17% 40.79% 41.98% 32.56% 22.34% 18.98% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
16.48% 12.77% 10.03% 8.83% 7.00% 5.02% 3.82% 3.74% 
College 32.57% 24.80% 19.10% 13.28% 9.05% 5.24% 3.78% 2.94% 
Postgraduate 6.31% 9.27% 7.46% 5.70% 3.53% 2.32% 1.46% 1.17% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2016 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
9.86% 11.94% 17.60% 23.25% 28.90% 36.32% 49.17% 59.18% 
Upper 
Secondary 
35.24% 35.87% 37.03% 38.19% 39.36% 38.12% 32.60% 27.22% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
16.33% 12.48% 11.29% 10.09% 8.90% 7.44% 5.63% 4.07% 
College 32.58% 33.02% 28.14% 23.26% 18.38% 13.40% 9.23% 7.05% 
Postgraduate 6.00% 6.69% 5.95% 5.21% 4.47% 4.72% 3.37% 2.49% 
 
Realized 
2016 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
8.82% 13.63% 17.96% 25.58% 29.53% 37.32% 48.96% 59.52% 
Upper 
Secondary 
30.56% 29.52% 30.62% 31.81% 34.21% 34.17% 29.33% 23.59% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
17.71% 15.65% 12.83% 11.15% 10.44% 9.60% 7.82% 6.02% 
College 35.93% 30.13% 26.52% 21.22% 16.67% 12.67% 8.70% 7.51% 
Postgraduate 6.98% 11.07% 12.06% 10.25% 9.15% 6.24% 5.18% 3.36% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2016 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
6.94% 14.33% 18.97% 23.61% 28.24% 37.92% 54.02% 67.45% 
Upper 
Secondary 
32.04% 30.83% 35.04% 39.25% 43.46% 44.28% 34.67% 23.87% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
15.33% 12.85% 11.45% 10.04% 8.63% 5.75% 3.73% 3.08% 
College 39.30% 34.29% 28.31% 22.33% 16.35% 9.73% 6.11% 4.45% 
Postgraduate 6.39% 7.69% 6.23% 4.77% 3.31% 2.32% 1.47% 1.14% 
 
Realized 
2016 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
7.08% 12.88% 19.30% 27.50% 32.23% 41.56% 54.73% 68.24% 
Upper 
Secondary 
28.90% 29.86% 33.86% 34.87% 38.22% 37.24% 30.90% 21.57% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
17.63% 15.68% 12.70% 10.92% 9.91% 8.35% 5.97% 4.24% 
College 37.88% 31.09% 24.54% 19.10% 14.19% 9.18% 6.14% 4.36% 
Postgraduate 8.50% 10.49% 9.60% 7.62% 5.45% 3.67% 2.27% 1.58% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2021 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
5.66% 8.32% 13.63% 17.96% 25.58% 29.53% 37.32% 48.96% 
Upper 
Secondary 
23.85% 24.72% 29.52% 30.62% 31.81% 34.21% 34.17% 29.33% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
20.31% 18.64% 15.65% 12.83% 11.15% 10.44% 9.60% 7.82% 
College 42.55% 35.86% 30.13% 26.52% 21.22% 16.67% 12.67% 8.70% 
Postgraduate 7.63% 12.46% 11.07% 12.06% 10.25% 9.15% 6.24% 5.18% 
 
Projected 
2021 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
4.62% 8.26% 11.88% 19.30% 27.50% 32.23% 41.56% 54.73% 
Upper 
Secondary 
22.71% 24.07% 30.86% 33.86% 34.87% 38.22% 37.24% 30.90% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
18.78% 18.59% 15.68% 12.70% 10.92% 9.91% 8.35% 5.97% 
College 43.19% 37.37% 31.09% 24.54% 19.10% 14.19% 9.18% 6.14% 
Postgraduate 10.70% 11.72% 10.49% 9.60% 7.62% 5.45% 3.67% 2.27% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2026 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
2.51% 3.01% 8.32% 13.63% 17.96% 25.58% 29.53% 37.32% 
Upper 
Secondary 
17.13% 19.92% 24.72% 29.52% 30.62% 31.81% 34.21% 34.17% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
22.90% 21.62% 18.64% 15.65% 12.83% 11.15% 10.44% 9.60% 
College 49.17% 41.59% 35.86% 30.13% 26.52% 21.22% 16.67% 12.67% 
Postgraduate 8.28% 13.85% 12.46% 11.07% 12.06% 10.25% 9.15% 6.24% 
 
Projected 
2026 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
2.15% 3.64% 8.26% 11.88% 19.30% 27.50% 32.23% 41.56% 
Upper 
Secondary 
16.52% 18.28% 24.07% 30.86% 33.86% 34.87% 38.22% 37.24% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
19.94% 21.49% 18.59% 15.68% 12.70% 10.92% 9.91% 8.35% 
College 48.50% 43.66% 37.37% 31.09% 24.54% 19.10% 14.19% 9.18% 
Postgraduate 12.90% 12.94% 11.72% 10.49% 9.60% 7.62% 5.45% 3.67% 
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A5. Continued 
Projected 
2031 
   Male     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
0.00% 0.00% 3.01% 8.32% 13.63% 17.96% 25.58% 29.53% 
Upper 
Secondary 
9.77% 12.82% 19.92% 24.72% 29.52% 30.62% 31.81% 34.21% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
25.49% 24.61% 21.62% 18.64% 15.65% 12.83% 11.15% 10.44% 
College 55.80% 47.32% 41.59% 35.86% 30.13% 26.52% 21.22% 16.67% 
Postgraduate 8.94% 15.24% 13.85% 12.46% 11.07% 12.06% 10.25% 9.15% 
 
Projected 
2031 
   Female     
25 – 29 30 – 34 35 – 59 40 – 44 45 – 49 50 – 54 55 – 59 60 – 64 
Lower 
Secondary 
or below 
0.00% 0.00% 3.64% 8.26% 11.88% 19.30% 27.50% 32.23% 
Upper 
Secondary 
10.01% 11.50% 18.28% 24.07% 30.86% 33.86% 34.87% 38.22% 
Non-degree 
post-
secondary 
21.09% 24.40% 21.49% 18.59% 15.68% 12.70% 10.92% 9.91% 
College 53.81% 49.94% 43.66% 37.37% 31.09% 24.54% 19.10% 14.19% 
Postgraduate 15.09% 14.16% 12.94% 11.72% 10.49% 9.60% 7.62% 5.45% 
 
